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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper consists in testing the profitability of simple technical trading rules
in the Italian stock market. By means of a recently developed bootstrap methodology
we assess whether technical rules based on moving averages are capable of producing
excess returns with respect to the Buy-and-Hold strategy. We find that in most cases
the rules are profitable and the excess return is statistically significant. However, the
well-known problem of data-snooping, which seems to be confirmed by our analysis,
requires some caution in the application of these methods.
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1 Introduction
Technical analysis can de defined as a set of heterogeneous tools whose purpose
consists in forecasting future prices on the basis of historical prices and market statistics.
The development of these methods can be traced back to the late 1800’s, but, until recent
years, financial theory has always been biased against technical analysis. The literature
generated by the debate confronting technical analysts and academics is huge; although
it is impossible to enter into details here (see Beber 1999 for a review), it is worth giving
an up-to-date summary. Before we start dealing with technicalities, this will indeed help
clarifying the aim of this paper.
The dispute has mainly to do with the following question: is the market efficient?
If the answer is positive, current prices fully incorporate all available information; in
this case, it is not difficult to show that the expected value of the returns of any strategy
based on time-t information is equal to zero, and the data generating process (DGP)
of the returns is the random walk; in this case, technical analysis would be useless.
On the other hand, if the answer is negative, current prices do not incorporate all
available information, and therefore they are different from their equilibrium level, so
that using historical information to determine the equilibrium price can be profitable,
as it is different from the current price.
Early tests of market efficiency were mostly indirect, i.e., they tested the random
walk hypothesis (see Campbell et al. 1997, chap. 2). Direct tests, which investigate
whether specific trading rules are profitable, have been developed more recently, and
were mostly spurred by practitioners’ interests: not surprisingly, the role of trading rules
became quickly the main object of analysis. In the latter category, bootstrap methods
have been extensively used (LeBaron 1991, Brock et al. 1992, Kim 1994, Karolyi and
Kho 1994, Le Baron 1996); however, their application to a time series setup, where data
are not independent, is not as straightforward as the classical bootstrap with indepen-
dent and identically distributed (iid) data, so that these experiments produced mixed
evidence (see Maddala and Li 1996 for a critical review). Moreover, the procedure is too
complicated to give traders quick indications useful for taking positions in the market.
A major improvement has been achieved by Sullivan et al. (1999); their methodology,
which allows a fully non-parametric implementation of the bootstrap, will be used, with
some modifications, in this paper.
By now, the academic prejudice against technical analysis has consistently weak-
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ened, as witnessed by the growing number of papers published in academic journals
about the relationship between financial and econometric theory on one hand and meth-
ods used by practitioners on the other hand (Lo et al. 2000, Osler 2003). The efficient
market hypothesis has indeed been questioned by several empirical studies, and although
there is no agreement about the reason (market inefficiency and time-varying equilib-
rium returns being the most likely ones), the belief that future returns are predictable on
the basis of past returns is now, at least, an issue which deserves investigation. More-
over, Kavajecz and Odders-White (2003) recently introduced a new approach which
tries to explain the predictability of returns by means of limited order book liquidity,
so that technical analysis would be consistent with market efficiency.
The aim of this work consists in testing whether the most common trading rules,
i.e. moving average-based rules, are profitable in the Italian stock market and providing
directions about their practical application. Overall, we find that the trading rules are
profitable; statistical significance is higher for rules based on short moving averages, for
which the number of trades is larger and consequently the transaction costs are higher.
Further analysis shows that profitability is more questionable when we explicitly take
into account transaction fees.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
the technical trading rules used for the test; section 3 provides details of the testing
methodology; section 4 shows the results of the empirical analysis; section 5 concludes.
2 Data and technical rules description
2.1. Data description
For our test we will use daily data of four of the most liquid Italian stocks: Alleanza,
Telecom Italia, Unicredito and Fiat. The sample period is August 15, 1985 to January 6,
2003. We will also perform the calculations using data of the FIB30 index, i.e. the future
on the MIB30 index; in this case the sample period is November 28, 1994 to August
5, 2003. The main reason for the inclusion in the analysis of the latter data is that
dividends, which are ignored in the computations concerning individual stocks, are of
no concern with futures data. All the data, here and in the following, were downloaded
from Bloomberg. Standard descriptive statistics are shown in table 1; figures 1 and 3a
show the histograms of daily returns, whereas figures 2 and 3b show the levels.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Numbers marked with ∗ are significant at the 5% level.
Alleanza Telecom Italia Unicredito Fiat FIB30
# of obs. 4538 4538 4538 4538 2267
kurtosis 10.19 10.69 10.90 6.42 5.12
skewness −0.14 −0.41 0.79 0.13 −0.04
ACF(1) 0.041∗ 0.074∗ 0.089∗ 0.064∗ −0.015
ACF(2) 0.007 0.005 −0.003 −0.004 0.021
ACF(3) −0.054∗ −0.015 −0.008 0.027 −0.023
ACF(4) −0.015 0.029 −0.010 0.023 0.033
Unsurprisingly, from the table and the figures it turns out that the data show some
serial correlation and are leptokurtic.
Finally, it is worth noting that dividends are ignored; this omission could lead to
a few mistakes when computing the returns for the individual stocks, as the price of a
stock drops after the dividend payment. However, usually dividends are rather small,
so that this way of proceeding should not introduce any major bias.
2.2. Technical trading rules
An extremely large number of trading rules have been developed over the years
(see Appendix A in Sullivan et al. 1999 for a review). As this paper also aims at taking
into account what traders do in practical applications, we will focus on rules based
on moving averages, which are indeed widely used and can be tested without being
computationally cumbersome.
At time t, the moving average of length R is given by
MA(R)t =
1
R
R−1∑
i=0
Pt−i, t = R,R + 1, . . . , T.
The basic idea underlying the use of moving averages as trading signals is the following.
Suppose that
Pt−1 < MA
(R)
t−1 and Pt ≥MA(R)t ; (1)
in this case we assume that an upward trend has initiated, and therefore we take a long
position. Similarly, if
Pt−1 ≥MA(R)t−1 and Pt < MA(R)t , (2)
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we are confident that we are entering a downward trend, and we take a short position.
Numerous modifications of (1) and (2) have been developed; we mention here the in-
troduction of a band b > 0 around the moving average so that a long position is taken
when Pt ≥MA(R)t + b ·MA(R)t and closed when Ps < MA(R)s (s > t); similarly, a short
position is opened when Pt < MA
(R)
t − b ·MA(R)t and closed when Ps ≥MA(R)s (s > t);
the introduction of the band should help avoiding the so called “false signals”.
According to these indications, a signal function can be defined as follows:
St =

1 if Pt ≥MA(R)t + b · MA(R)t
0 if MA(R)t − b · MA(R)t ≤ Pt < MA(R)t + b · MA(R)t
−1 if Pt < MA(R)t − b · MA(R)t , t = R, . . . , T .
(3)
Notice that, if b = 0, St can only take value 1 or −1, i.e. the trader is always in the
market.
3 Testing Methodology
The classical way of testing the performance of trading rules consists in applying
the rules to a long time series of returns of the traded security and defining a ranking
based on the excess returns over a benchmark model, usually the Buy-and-Hold (B/H)
strategy.
When tackling this problem, we are immediately confronted with a difficulty: trad-
ing rules lack theoretical foundations. In principle, this implies that any mechanical
rule could work and the set of rules to consider is infinite. This issue was first identified
by Jensen and Bennington (1970, pag. 470): “given enough computer time, we are
sure that we can find a mechanical trading rule which “works” on a table of random
numbers - provided of course that we are allowed to test the rule on the same table of
numbers which we used to discover the rule”. It is strictly related to what is currently
known under the name of data-snooping (Brock et al. 1992, LeBaron 1996, Sullivan et
al. 1999). In essence, data-snooping means that the “best” trading rule is chosen on the
basis of the returns obtained from the application to an observed data series (that is,
a single realization of the data generating process), and its superior performance could
only hold for this realization.
Historically, in order to get around these difficulties, researchers have focused on
two methodologies. The simplest solution consists of splitting the observed series in
two periods; the first one (in-sample) is used to find the best trading rule, whereas the
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second one (out-of-sample) checks whether the ranking of the rules found in the first
period is preserved when the rules are applied to data from a different period.
The second methodology is based on the non-parametric bootstrap introduced by
Efron (1979); in the context of testing the efficiency of technical trading rules, different
variants were employed by Brock et al. (1992), LeBaron (1996) and Sullivan et al. (1999).
The non-parametric bootstrap with iid observations is based on drawing with re-
placement B samples from the data at hand, where B is a “large” number; more for-
mally, this means sampling from the empirical distribution function FN , which puts
probability 1/N on each observation; it can be shown that the empirical distribution
obtained in this way converges to the true distribution. However, it is quite clear that
the observations at hand are likely to be neither independent (because of serial corre-
lation) nor identically distributed (because of time-varying volatility), so that the basic
bootstrap might not be adequate.
To make things worse, when working with financial data a major difficulty arises:
it is not appropriate to bootstrap directly the time series of prices. In fact, if we follow
this way (see Maddala and Li 1996, pag. 466, for details), we do not perform any model
specification testing before bootstrapping, so that we run the risk of bootstrapping the
wrong model.
Over the years, this problem has been tackled in two ways. The first solution
consists of fitting a model to the time series of prices, bootstrapping the residuals
and generating bootstrap samples using the estimated parameters; this approach was
implemented by Brock et al. 1992 on American stock indices, and then by Hudson et
al. (1996) on UK data and by Isakov and Hollistein (1999) on Swiss data. However, all
of them found that specifications like random walk, AR(1) and GARCH do not seem
to work well, so that more complicated formulations would be called for.
The second solution (employed, for example, by LeBaron 1996) resamples the orig-
inal return series and then reconstructs the price series according to a prespecified
stochastic model for price evolution. Again, this is likely to be severely influenced by
the choice of the DGP; if the assumed DGP is different from the true DGP, the method
will produce wrong results.
As can be seen from these remarks, using the bootstrap with financial data is rather
dangerous. Maddala and Li (1996) thoroughly summarize the results of early applica-
tions: they point out that in many cases bootstrap methods were not applied correctly
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and are thus likely to have produced spurious results. They also notice that, even
though the final goal consists in checking profitability, model identification is crucial in
order to get meaningful results. It follows that the method is much less appealing in
this context than in the classical iid setup, where no distributional assumption is re-
quired: the need for a specification of a parametric model for price evolution constitutes
indeed a significant drawback. Moreover, a procedure which requires traders to carry
out model identification and estimation and then implement bootstrap to finally obtain
the desired result is clearly too laborious to be useful in practical applications.
A new approach has recently been developed by Sullivan et al. (1999) on the basis
of results obtained by White (2000) (1): it consists of resampling directly the returns
from the trading rules; the advantage of this solution is that model identification is
completely avoided. From a technical point of view, it has been shown by White (2000)
that this way of proceeding has all the desirable properties of the standard bootstrap
(for an accessible review of the results see appendix B of Sullivan et al. 1999).
To begin with the description of the methodology, let
f¯ = n−1
T∑
t=R
ft+1
be the “performance statistic”, where R is the length of the longest moving average and
n = T −R + 1 (starting the indexing from R just means that the first R data are only
used to compute the moving average). ft is a v × 1 vector, where v is the number of
trading rules and fit, the i-th element of ft, gives the time-t excess return from the i-th
trading rule:
fit = Sit · log(Pt+1/Pt)− S0t · log(Pt+1/Pt), i = 1, . . . , v; t = R, . . . , T.
Notice that S0t identifies the benchmark model, which in the following is given by the
B/H strategy. Sit is a signal function which takes values in the set {1, 0,−1}: for moving
average-based rules it has already been defined in (3). The values −1, 0 and 1 represent
short, neutral and long positions respectively.
The null hypothesis we are interested in is that the technical trading rule’s perfor-
mance is no better than the performance of the B/H strategy:
H0 : E(fi) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , v. (4)
(1) Careful readers are certainly thinking that (at least) one of these dates is wrong, but both of them are
indeed correct; nevertheless, for this sentence to make sense, we have to admit that White’s results must have
been obtained before 2000...
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In terms of profitability, we hope to be able reject H0; this would mean that the differ-
ence between the return from the trading rule and the return from the B/H strategy is
statistically significant.
Sullivan et al. (1999) implicitly assume that every conceivable trading rule has the
same chance of being the best one; according to this starting point, it is clear that
the analysis has to test simultaneously all possible rules, because it could be that the
most commonly used trading rules, which are typically the ones that historically have
shown the best performance, have been considered “best” just because of data-snooping.
They point out that these trading rules could have emerged as superior as the result of
a “subtle survivorship bias”: historically, investors tried out numerous rules, but after a
while they kept using only a small subset of them (the “best” rules). If these ones had
emerged in virtue of data-snooping, then the only way of discovering it would consist
in confronting them with the neglected rules as well.
This approach has the obvious drawback of being computationally cumbersome,
because a huge number of trading rules needs to be considered; in addition, the require-
ment of checking all possible rules seems to be very difficult to fulfill as the set of rules
is in principle infinite. For these reasons we will introduce some modifications.
In our opinion it is unlikely for a rule to have arisen as a well-performing one only
because of data-snooping: typically, these rules have indeed been checked independently
by many researchers using different data and/or time horizons, so that we believe they
do have some economic content. The bootstrap has a central role here: if a rule is not
effective, the bootstrap will certainly allow us to discover it. In summary, we prefer to
rely on the hypothesis (that we believe has an high probability of being true) that the
most commonly used trading rules are also the “best” ones. Because of the bootstrap
check, there is essentially no risk of making incorrect inferences about trading rules: if
this assumption is not supported by the data, the bootstrap will reveal it. In this way
the results are more easily interpreted and the computational burden is much smaller.
Thus, we apply the bootstrap to the observed values fi,R, fi,R+1, . . . , fi,T of the
returns from each trading rule and obtain B bootstrapped values of f¯i, denoted by
f¯∗(j)i , where j indexes the B bootstrap samples. Finally, we compute the following
statistics:
V¯i =
√
nf¯i;
V¯ ∗i =
√
n(f¯∗i − f¯i).
The p-value for the null hypothesis is obtained by comparing V¯i to the quantiles of V¯ ∗i .
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To take into account the features of time series data, several extensions of the
basic bootstrap have been developed (Davison and Hinkley 1997, chap. 8); all of them
are based on the concept of block bootstrap. The simplest version of this technique
subdivides the data into k non-overlapping blocks of length l, z1 = (x1, . . . , xl), z2 =
(xl+1, . . . , x2l), . . . , zk = (xkl−l+1, . . . , xkl), where kl = N . Instead of resampling single
observations, each bootstrap replication resamples blocks of consecutive observations.
In this way we try to preserve some of the dependence of the original data; in general we
observe that the “proportion of dependency” captured by the series so reconstructed is
positively related to l; obviously, with l = N the series will have the same dependency
of the original series. The choice of the block length has therefore to consider two
contrasting requirements: on one hand l should be large in order to preserve as much
as possible of the dependency of the original series; on the other hand, one wants to
have a large number of distinct bootstrap replications in order to reliably use the the
asymptotic theory which underlies the bootstrap, and this would require many short
blocks (that is, large k and small l).
Various modifications of the the block bootstrap have been considered; in the fol-
lowing we will use the stationary bootstrap introduced by Politis and Romano (1994)
and applied in the same context by Sullivan et al. (1999). This approach resamples
from non-overlapping blocks of random length L, where L has a geometric distribution
of parameter p = 1/l:
P (L = l) = (1− p)l−1p, l = 1, 2, . . . (5)
As shown by Politis and Romano (1994), series obtained by means of this approach are
stationary.
It is hardly worth noting that a statistical test for the hypothesis (4) could be easily
constructed, by means of standard arguments, under the assumption of normality (see,
for example, Brock et al. 1992, pag. 1738); however this assumption is clearly violated
here, so that we prefer to rely on the bootstrap approach only.
4 Empirical Results
4.1. Results for the mean return criterion
We first test the behavior of technical rules when the performance measure is the
mean annualized return, i.e. the daily return multiplied by 261, the number of working
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days in a year; as usual, daily returns are given by rt = log(Pt/Pt−1). Part A of figures
4 to 8 shows the results: the graphs report the mean annualized return for lengths of the
moving average from 3 to 100 days. It is clear that using rules based on short moving
averages gives larger returns: for the individual stocks the largest returns are obtained
with the 3- and 4-days moving averages; only for the FIB30 index the best results are
given by the 10-days moving average.
Overall, the returns shown in the figures are surprisingly large; to check whether
they are significantly larger than the returns from the B/H strategy, we ran a bootstrap
analysis, based on 1000 replications, for the rules which show the largest returns. In the
implementation of the stationary bootstrap it is required to specify the parameter p in
(5); from the properties of the geometric distribution, the mean block length is equal to
1/p. Given the low serial correlation of our data, we chose p = 0.1, which corresponds
to a mean block length of 10. The results are given in table 2. As for p, we performed
a small sensitivity analysis by trying out p = 0.01 and p = 0.5; the results obtained are
nearly identical to the ones shown in table 2.
Table 2. Bootstrap analysis. The numbers in the table are p-values obtained by comparing V¯i to the
distribution of V¯ ∗i , computed with B=1000 replications and lengths of the moving average from 3 to 15 days.
Alleanza Telecom Italia Unicredito Fiat FIB30
MA3 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.278
MA4 0.053 0.017 0.007 0.000 0.336
MA5 0.269 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.198
MA6 0.345 0.012 0.015 0.000 0.511
MA7 0.385 0.011 0.087 0.001 0.415
MA8 0.394 0.018 0.094 0.003 0.463
MA10 0.635 0.035 0.553 0.009 0.247
MA15 0.625 0.061 0.381 0.018 0.321
Here we observe a marked difference between the behavior of the rules for Telecom
Italia, Unicredito and Fiat on one hand and for the FIB30 index on the other hand;
in the latter case, excess return is never significant, whereas it is always significant for
the three stocks, not only for the single best trading rule but also for the other well-
performing strategies. As for Alleanza, empirical evidence is less clear-cut, with the
best rule only being significant.
Another question deserves some investigation: is the choice of the trading rule
sensitive to changing market conditions? To explore this issue, we follow a strategy
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(sometimes called Cumulative Wealth Rule - CWR) which was first introduced by Lukac
et al. (1988). Suppose to have N years of data; in the first step, use the first three years
(in-sample) to find the best strategy, and use it over the fourth year (out-of-sample);
in the second step use the second, third and fourth year (in-sample) to find the best
strategy, and use it over the fifth year (out-of-sample). Proceed in this way until the
final step, where the data of years N − 3, N − 2 and N − 1 are used in-sample and
the data of the last year are used out-of-sample. The return from the strategy is finally
given by the mean of the returns obtained in the out-of-sample periods.
Table 3 provides the result of the CWR as well as some details about the best
trading rules; as for the CWR, it outperforms the benchmark, with the exception of
Telecom Italia, but its return is smaller than the profit from the best rule; this reflects
the important fact that investors could not have known in advance the ex post best-
performing strategy. As for the best rules, it is worth noting that, on average, profits
from long trades are higher than profits from short trades. Both these findings are
actually very similar to the ones obtained by Sullivan et al. (1999, pag. 1667-8).
For practical applications it is important to consider the temporal evolution of the
profit from the rules. It is indeed frequent that, at some time t∗ during the period under
investigation, the trader would lose some money by closing the position in t∗; as it is
quite common to use stop loss rules, it is relevant to quantify the maximum loss from
the strategy in the period of application. The results are shown in table 3; it can be seen
that using, for example, a 10% stop loss threshold, in two cases out of five (Alleanza
and FIB30) we would close the trade before the end of the period.
Table 3. Detailed results for the best rules and returns from the cumulative wealth rule
Alleanza Telecom It. Unicr. Fiat FIB30
Best rule MA3 MA3 MA3 MA4 MA5
Ann. return 38.83 44.38 39.39 38.91 15.59
B/H ann. return 10.72 14.59 8.92 −1.46 6.75
# of trades 1533 1504 1505 1262 535
# of long trades 767 752 753 631 267
# of short trades 766 752 752 631 268
Mean ret. per long tr. 0.559 0.678 0.555 0.513 0.350
Mean ret. per short tr. 0.318 0.345 0.352 0.553 0.151
Maximum percentage loss 11.25 3.55 7.51 3.39 22.13
Ann. return from CWR 15.02 9.57 29.44 31.67 11.08
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So far, transaction costs have been ignored; however, in practice, they are obviously
important. Part B of figures 4 to 8 shows the number of trades for each strategy, and it
can be seen that it is much larger for the rules based on short moving averages, so that
it is likely that these rules are not the best ones after the introduction of transaction
costs.
In order to check the impact of transaction costs we ran the same analysis assuming
that to each trade is associated a cost c equal to 0.1%, 0.2% and 0.3% (this is supposed
to include slippage costs as well). The results are shown in figures 9 to 12. Except
for one case (Alleanza), as costs increase, the most profitable rule shifts from the 3-
(Telecom Italia, Unicredito) or 4-days (Fiat) moving average to strategies based on
longer moving averages. This is particularly apparent for Telecom Italia and for the
FIB30 index: with c = 0.3%, the best rules become respectively the 14- and 35-days
moving average. The reason is that, with longer moving averages, smaller profits are
more than compensated by the decrease in costs determined by the reduced number of
trades. However, the next important question is: do the best rules still provide us with
a return significantly larger than the B/H strategy? Again, the bootstrap analysis gives
us the answer; we show in table 4 the results obtained with c = 0.2%, which seems to
be the approximate market level of the transaction costs.
Table 4. Bootstrap analysis. The numbers in the table are p-values obtained by comparing V¯i to the
distribution of V¯ ∗i , computed with B=1000 replications and several lengths of the moving average; percentage
cost of a single transaction is c=0.2%.
Alleanza Telecom Italia Unicredito Fiat FIB30
MA3 0.168 0.141 0.113 0.088 0.828
MA4 0.401 0.215 0.103 0.012 0.771
MA5 0.739 0.155 0.068 0.012 0.621
MA6 0.713 0.137 0.162 0.007 0.835
MA7 0.737 0.095 0.334 0.013 0.763
MA10 0.880 0.133 0.850 0.040 0.519
MA15 0.787 0.146 0.611 0.042 0.562
From table 4 it can be seen that the difference between the returns from the trading
rules and the B/H strategy is statistically significant only for Fiat (probably because
the B/H strategy’s performance is particularly poor in this case).
Finally, we implemented trading rules based on moving averages with a band, as
explained in section 2.2. We applied bands b equal to 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02
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and 0.03; to save space, results are not shown here but are available upon request. In
general, as the band increases, both returns and number of trades get smaller; these
rules could therefore be interesting only when transaction costs are high. However, with
the costs considered so far, the reduction in the number of trades does not seem to be
sufficiently large to guarantee a net profit larger than the one obtained from the moving
average rules with no band used before.
4.1. Results for the Sharpe ratio criterion
When evaluating performance, it is of some importance to measure risk-adjusted
profits; to this aim we will follow the literature (LeBaron 1996, Sullivan et al. 1999) in
computing the Sharpe ratio, which gives the mean excess return per unit risk (see for
example Campbell et al. 1997, pag. 188):
SRi =
µi − rf
σfi
, i = 1, . . . , v,
where rf is the risk-free rate. As a proxy of the risk-free interest rate, we use the 3-
months Libor rate; due to data availability, here the sample period is January 1, 1989
to January 6, 2003. The null hypothesis of interest is now
H0 : g(E(hi)) ≤ g(E(h0)), i = 1, . . . , v,
where the components of the (3× 1) vector hi,t+1 are given by
h1i,t+1 = rt+1Sit,
h2i,t+1 = (rt+1Sit)
2,
h3i,t+1 = rft+1,
and the function g(·) is defined as follows:
g(E(hi,t+1)) =
E(h1i,t+1)− E(h3i,t+1)√
E(h2i,t+1)− (E(h1i,t+1))2
.
Tables 5 and 6 show respectively the Sharpe ratios computed with the observed data
and the bootstrap p-values.
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Table 5. Results for the Sharpe ratio criterion. This table reports the Sharpe ratio for the B/H
strategy and for trading rules based on several lengths of the moving average.
Alleanza Telecom Italia Unicredito Fiat FIB30
B/H 0.307 0.463 0.224 −0.277 0.264
MA3 1.123 1.090 1.082 0.895 0.524
MA4 0.847 0.757 0.984 1.099 0.525
MA5 0.608 0.831 1.015 1.087 0.679
MA6 0.378 0.828 0.721 0.965 0.291
MA7 0.259 0.843 0.568 0.905 0.435
MA8 0.193 0.802 0.529 0.763 0.340
MA9 0.104 0.683 0.346 0.736 0.472
MA10 0.031 0.715 0.149 0.597 0.608
MA15 0.009 0.740 0.173 0.435 0.433
Table 6. Bootstrap Analysis. The numbers in the table are p-values obtained by applying the bootstrap to
the observed values of the Sharpe ratio; B=1000 replications.
Alleanza Telecom Italia Unicredito Fiat FIB30
MA3 0.022 0.051 0.006 0.002 0.292
MA4 0.076 0.233 0.021 0.000 0.303
MA5 0.229 0.182 0.014 0.001 0.199
MA6 0.462 0.166 0.070 0.000 0.448
MA7 0.540 0.179 0.158 0.003 0.358
MA8 0.636 0.202 0.176 0.001 0.457
MA9 0.712 0.330 0.380 0.007 0.308
MA10 0.756 0.316 0.580 0.012 0.201
MA15 0.778 0.240 0.551 0.044 0.324
These results essentially confirm (with the partial exception of Telecom Italia) the evi-
dence obtained according to the mean return criterion, with the shortest averages being
the best ones.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the profitability of some simple technical trading
rules in the Italian stock market. As a general conclusion, the rules seem to give
good results: profits from these strategies are significantly larger than profits from the
Buy-and-Hold strategy; in particular, short-term moving averages produce the best
performances, and the significance of these performances has been confirmed by the
bootstrap analysis. The only disturbing aspect is that the evidence is not homogeneous
14
across assets, as it is highly significant for Telecom Italia, Unicredito and Fiat, significant
(but only in the case of the single best-performing rule) for Alleanza and non-significant
for the FIB30 index. We do not have an explanation for this phenomenon, which seems
to be an example of data-snooping.
Moreover, one should keep in mind that, in practice, it is unreasonable to assume
that there are no transaction costs, and the introduction of transaction fees significantly
reduces the trading rules’ excess return.
Overall, our findings are in line with the results obtained by other researchers using
data from different stock markets. This seems to imply that the features of the most
liquid stock markets are similar all over the world and there is thus room for generating
significant profits by means of the tools of technical analysis.
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